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Abstract
Background: In September 2007, an outbreak of acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis (AHC) occurred in Keelung City and
spread to Taipei City. In response to the epidemic, a new crisis management program was implemented and tested in
Taipei.
Methodology and Principal Findings: Having noticed that transmission surged on weekends during the Keelung epidemic,
Taipei City launched a multi-channel mass risk communications program that included short message service (SMS)
messages sent directly to approximately 2.2 million Taipei residents on Friday, October 12th, 2007. The public was told to
keep symptomatic students from schools and was provided guidelines for preventing the spread of the disease at home.
Epidemiological characteristics of Taipei’s outbreak were analyzed from 461 sampled AHC cases. Median time from
exposure to onset of the disease was 1 day. This was significantly shorter for cases occurring in family clusters than in class
clusters (mean6SD: 2.663.2 vs. 4.3964.82 days, p=0.03), as well as for cases occurring in larger family clusters as opposed
to smaller ones (1.261.7 days vs. 3.964.0 days, p,0.01). Taipei’s program had a significant impact on patient compliance.
Home confinement of symptomatic children increased from 10% to 60% (p,0.05) and helped curb the spread of AHC.
Taipei experienced a rapid decrease in AHC cases between the Friday of the SMS announcement and the following Monday,
October 15, (0.70% vs. 0.36%). By October 26, AHC cases reduced to 0.01%. The success of this risk communication program
in Taipei (as compared to Keelung) is further reflected through rapid improvements in three epidemic indicators: (1)
significantly lower crude attack rates (1.95% vs. 14.92%, p,0.001), (2) a short epidemic period of AHC (13 vs. 34 days), and
(3) a quick drop in risk level (1,2 weeks) in Taipei districts that border Keelung (the original domestic epicenter).
Conclusions and Significance: The timely launch of this systematic, communication-based intervention proved effective at
preventing a dangerous spike in AHC and was able to bring this high-risk disease under control. We recommend that public
health officials incorporate similar methods into existing guidelines for preventing pandemic influenza and other emerging
infectious diseases.
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Introduction
The viral illness known as acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis
(AHC) is frequently accompanied by a highly transmissible acute
eye infection. This infection is most often caused by the
adenovirus, enterovirus 70, and Coxsackie’s virus. Coxsackie
A24 infection was first reported in 1969 in Ghana and has since
appeared around the world [1,2,3,4,5].
Since late 2002, several AHC epidemics have occurred in Asian
countries such as Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore [6,7,8]. In
September 2007, southern China’s Coxsackie A24 AHC epidemic
spread to Hong Kong after first appearing on the mainland in early
summer. On September 18th, a cluster of cases with AHC-like
symptoms was first unofficially reported by the media in Keelung, a
harbor city bordering Taipei (816 km away from Hong Kong), in
northern Taiwan. Because AHC was not on Taiwan’s list of reported
communicable diseases at the time, it was difficult for public health
officials to collect adequate epidemiological data until October 4th,
when a dramatic spike in AHC cases wasreported by the massmedia.
At that time, the Keelung Department of Health reported 2722 cases
of pink eye disease among public school students. Although general
control measures were taken, case numbers continued to increase
rapidly in Keelung, particularly during weekends.
Also on Oct. 4th, Taipei City Department of Health was alerted
to its first AHC cluster (20 cases from a primary school) in Neihu, a
Taipei district neighboring Keelung (Figure 1). Taipei was more
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 November 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 11 | e7962Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of the 2007 AHC Attack Rates in Taipei City and Keelung City. Geographical location of Taipei City and
Keelung City and their spatial relationship was shown in panel A. Spatial and temporal changes of AHC attack rates (AR) between Taipei City and
Keelung City were plotted according to their place in the outbreak timeline (panel B). Day 0 is used to indicate the days that cluster cases were first
identified in Taipei or in Keelung cities. Darker colored areas indicate regions with higher AR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.g001
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coverage of outbreaks in nearby Keelung. The local Department of
Health was also able to identify clusters quickly because it had made
school reporting of influenza-like illness clusters (or other unusual
clinical presentations) a mandatory practice since 2003.
Taipei’s Department of Health had reorganized its disease
control and prevention system against emerging infectious diseases
(EID) after 2003’s severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
epidemic but had not yet tested the system under real life
circumstances. In launching countermeasures to bring the AHC
outbreak under control, the Taipei Department of Health was also
able to test its system and fine-tune its public health response for
future EIDs. To evaluate the effectiveness of these intervention
measures, daily surveillance was conducted to analyze the
incidence rate and temporal-spatial distribution of new AHC
cases. In addition, students’ parents were sent questionnaires to
capture their experience with these preventative measures.
Materials and Methods
Setting
Taipei City, the largest city in Taiwan, is located in northern
Taiwan and directly borders Keelung City (Figure 1). In 2007,
Taipei, a city of 2.6 million people occupying 271.8 km
2, had a
student population of 277,159 (10.53%). Taipei City has a larger
population size and density than neighboring Keelung City
(Table 1), and is, thus, exceedingly vulnerable to microbial
transmission and EID outbreaks.
Ethics
This study was approved by the Advisory Committee for
Infectious Diseases Control of Taipei City’s Department of
Health, Taipei City Government. Informed consent was obtained
from the parents of participating schoolchildren in writing before
they were asked to complete the questionnaire (File S1).
Surveillance Methods
In response to a large outbreak of SARS in 2003, Taipei’s
Department of Heath established anew crisismanagement system with
the goals of detecting EIDs early, implementing appropriate and timely
public health responses, and administering effective risk management
[9,10]. At the start of Taiwan’s 2007 AHC outbreak, local health
departments in all of Taiwan’s cities were engaged in a passive
surveillance system in which schools reported cases as they occurred.
On October 4th, Taipei’s Department of Health urged schools and
kindergartens with clusters of more than three AHC cases to actively
report cases to the local Department of Health twice weekly. Age-
specific incidence rates of AHC among school-aged children during the
outbreak were also calculated using the collected surveillance data.
When total AHC cases in Taipei reached close to 500 on
October 11, 2007, an active school-based surveillance system was
launched by the city to monitor trends in the spread of AHC and
evaluate the effectiveness of intervention measures. Schools were
required to make daily reports to Taipei’s Department of
Education, regardless of whether there were any new cases on a
given day. As the incidence rate of the last reported AHC cases in
Keelung (on October 22) was 0.14%, we set this rate as a cut-off
point for comparing the effectiveness of the countermeasures used
by the two cities. Tailing data, i.e., data that fell below the 0.14%
incidence rate was excluded from our analysis. We used this cut-off
to define the duration of the AHC epidemics for both cities.
According to our definition, the AHC epidemics for each city
began from the date of the first reported cluster and ended on the
date that rates of new case incidence dropped to 0.14% or below.
Epidemiological Design and Data Analysis
1. Study subjects. We analyzed 461 reported AHC cases
from ten Taipei schools (totaling 18,134 students). Students from
six of the ten schools, three elementary schools and three junior
high schools, made up most of the reported AHC case numbers.
Two elementary schools and two junior high schools that were also
included in the research reported continuous AHC occurrences
during the week that our field epidemiological study was
conducted. For each of the ten schools, we randomly selected
one class that had had occurrences of AHC and one class where
there had been no occurrence of AHC as our case and control
groups, respectively. Data collected from these individual school
groupings were gathered and divided into one study and one
control group for data analysis.
2. Case definition of AHC and clusters (family,
school). The AHC cases in this study all involved an acute
conjunctiva inflammation that included eye redness (pink eye)
accompanied with pain, swelling, tearing, or discharge from one or
both eyes. Family clusters were defined as two or more cases of
AHC occurring in one family within 14 days. Class clusters were
defined as three or more AHC cases in one class of students within
7 days. Both family clusters and class clusters were charted
through epidemiological investigation.
3. Tempo-spatial data analysis. District-specific AHC
attack rates were calculated by dividing the number of reported
cases for each district by the total number of schoolchildren under its
supervision. The Kriging method [11,12], a statistical mapping
technique utilizing data collected at each location, was used to
interpolate each grid cell over a spatial domain. In this study, the
centroid of each grid designated the attack rate in each district. In
order to observe spatio-temporal spreading, Kriging assessed the
spatio-temporal interactions in a diffusion map. We made a surface
plot of daily time series as a gradient interpolated between adjacent
days and district data points. Distance in the map symbolizes relative
geographic relationship rather than actual distance. Townships were
ordered from East to West and from North to South.
Control Measures Used by Taipei City
To identify the possible etiologic agent of the outbreak, health
care professionals were required to administer eye swabs and
conduct laboratory testing. Local health workers were then able to
match the epidemiological characteristics for the confirmed agent,
Coxsackie A24, with appropriate and specific prevention and
control measures. Government officials of the Taipei City
Table 1. General Information on the AHC Outbreak in Taipei
City and Keelung City in 2007.
Demographic Information Taipei City Keelung City
Duration of the AHC Outbreak (days) 13 34
Population Size
Reported AHC Cases in School Children 5,414 6,154
Total Number of School Children 277,159 41,244
Crude Attack Rate (%)* 1.95% 14.92%
Total Population 2,632,242 390,084
Population Density (per Km
2) 9684.5 2937.4
Geographic Area (Km
2) 271.8 132.8
*p,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.t001
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press releases and used a variety of health education methods to
reach the public. Beginning on October 5, public service messages
were delivered to kindergartens, primary schools, middle schools,
and high schools to encourage children to avoid touching their eyes,
washtheir handsroutinely,and participate in disinfectingthe school
environment. Within schools, health education programming
during daily morning assemblies provided updates to students and
teachers regarding the current status of the epidemic and additional
measures that were needed to reduce infections. A special telephone
hotline was also established to improve case reporting and provide
up-to-date disease counseling from health care institutions.
These measures, though helpful, had also been used in Keelung
and had, thus far, proven inadequate at containing the epidemic.
In early October 2007, Taipei City government decided to adopt a
more aggressive campaign against the epidemic by implementing
an ‘‘incident management system.’’ This system required various
administrative agencies to follow an integrated disaster response
plan. Although school closures and class cancellation were not
required for schools with reported AHC cases, schools were
encouraged to persuade symptomatic students to stay home and
provide guidance on how to prevent the spread of the infection in
the home environment. In addition, schools were authorized to
keep symptomatic students from entering the school in case
parents insisted on their attendance. If infected students were able
to gain entry to school premises, the school was authorized to
prevent them from joining public activities (such as swimming).
School absenteeism was also reported and recorded daily.
The Taipei City Department of Health devised backup plans
should the above-mentioned measures not succeed. These plans
included separate care facilities for AHC patients at ophthalmic
clinics, more intensive segregation of symptomatic students from
classmates (in the classroom, at public washbasins, and during
outdoor student activities), and quarantines that required symp-
tomatic students to stay at home for seven days.
Mass Risk Communication Program (MRCP)
Monday incidence reports (Figure 2) exhibited tremendous
increases in AHC case incidence during weekends in Keelung.
Mindful of these weekend spikes, Taipei implemented a multi-
channel risk communication prevention program during the
weekend of Friday, October 12 (2,253 new cases of AHC were
reported in Taipei on that date). This risk communication
program focused on communicating directly to the public
through three routes: (1) schools delivered a Taipei Department
of Health letter signed by the mayor (that detailed AHC
information and prevention methods) for students to take home
to their parents, (2) the mayor held a press conference to discuss
the epidemic and offer guidance to citizens for preventing the
spread of the disease, and (3) over 2.2 million short message
services (SMS) messages, a communication tool for exchanging
short text messages between mobile telephonic devices, were
delivered to all Taipei mobile phone numbers. The messages
briefed Taipei residents on the current status of the epidemic
and recommended citizen-level control measures. All commu-
nications suggested that symptomatic students stay at home,
Figure 2. Incidence Rate (IR) and Cumulative Number of AHC Cases among School Children in Taipei City and Keelung City,
October - November 2007. The figure’s arrow indicates the weekend in which children stayed at home instead of attending school. The MRCP was
launched on October 12th in Taipei City, causing the incidence rate (IR) of AHC to decline more rapidly in Taipei City than in Keelung City, where AHC
cases continued to increase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.g002
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household disinfection.
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Control Measures
On October 31st, all Taipei students involved in the study were
asked to give their parents a questionnaire devised to collect
epidemiological data and assess their opinions regarding Taipei
City’s infection control measures. The questionnaire asked about
the clinical symptoms/signs of children with AHC, school
attendance, and inquired on parents’ sources of disease prevention
information. Parents were also asked to comment on their degree
of satisfaction with Taipei City’s public health efforts and provide
suggestions for improving future SMS alerts.
We evaluated the effectiveness of the control measures based on the
duration of the epidemic and the attack rate of the disease among
school students in both Taipei and Keelung. As Keelung was without a
risk communications program, and had only applied the general
control measures recommended by Taiwan’s Center for Disease
Control (Taiwan CDC), the effectiveness of the special measures taken
by Taipei City could be readily calculated through direct comparison.
Results
Because this study utilized risk communication methods used to
minimize the public health threat of an unusual outbreak, we briefly
describe the 2007 AHC epidemic below and analyze the
effectivenessof the chosenmethods using epidemiological measures.
A. The 2007 AHC Epidemic
1. AHC attack rates in Taipei and Keelung Cities. At the
beginning of the epidemic, the etiologic agent of this AHC
outbreak was unknown. On October 12th, based on culture and
sequencing analysis performed at Taiwan CDC, the pathogen was
identified as the A24 variant of the Coxsackie virus [13]. The
epidemic lasted 13 days in Taipei (5,414 cases), and 34 days in
Keelung (6,154 cases) (Table 1). Keelung City applied general
control measures and Keelung CDC monitored daily reported
new cases as suggested by Taiwan’s CDC. However, there was no
further assessment by Keelung on the effectiveness of its control
measures. The crude attack rate of AHC in Keelung was
significantly higher than in Taipei (14.92% vs. 1.95%; p,0.001).
After the risk communication program was implemented in Taipei
the overall incidence in the city decreased significantly (0.093%
before vs. 0.056% after; p,0.001) while the incidence rates in
Keelung continued to increase almost every weekend (Figure 2).
The greatest number of AHC cases in Taipei City occurred on a
Friday (October 12), signaling an upcoming weekend spike in
infections. However, on that day, Taipei City government
launched the multi-channel risk communication program, greatly
reducing the incidence rate and, in effect, causing a sharp weekend
drop in new cases. Because of such measures, the epidemic ebbed
much earlier in Taipei than in Keelung (Figure 3).
2. Epidemiological characteristics. The outbreaks began
in Keelung in September of 2007. Due to the high frequency of
transportation from Keelung to Taipei, the epidemic gradually
reached Taipei. Districts in Taipei City closest to Keelung City
began to see an increase in their attack rates on October 8th
(Figure 3). The wave of new infections moved steadily from the
northeast districts to the southwest districts of Taipei. In both
cities, the disease spread citywide within a short period (4 days), as
shown in Figure 1, and the median time between exposure and
onset of disease was as short as 1 day [mean 6 standard deviation
(SD): 2.663.2 days, range 0 to 16 days] [Figure 4]. The mean time
from exposure to onset of AHC was significantly shorter in family
clusters than in school cluster cases (mean 6 SD: 2.663.2 vs.
4.3964.82 days, p=0.03). The mean and range of time between
exposure and disease onset was also significantly shorter in larger
family clusters (.3 AHC cases per family) than in smaller ones
(, = =3 AHC cases) (1.261.7 days, range 0 to 6 days vs. 3.964.0
days, range 0 to 16 days, respectively) (p,0.01).
In terms of risk factors (Table 2), boys were at significantly
higher risk for AHC-related pink eye than girls (OR=2.14,
p,0.001), and older children (over 10 years old) were generally at
higher risk for pink eye both at home (OR: 2.56, p=0.008) and at
school (OR 3.51, p,0.001). In general, children at northeastern
Taipei schools, located closest to Keelung, were at greater risk for
pink eye (OR=2.26, p-value=0.003) both at home (OR=3.93,
p-value ,0.001) and at school (OR=2.46, p-value =0.001), than
those at schools located in districts further away (Figure 1). In
addition, school children were identified as the index cases in
75.5% of fifty-three family clusters (40/53), demonstrating their
high risk for transmitting the disease to other family members.
B. Effectiveness of the Mass Risk Communication
Program
1. Home confinement of symptomatic school children.
On Friday, October 12th (a day marked for its dramatic spike in
new cases) the multi-channel mass risk communication program
was launched in Taipei just prior to the weekend. On that day,
three containment measures were urgently implemented: (1) the
mayor addressed the press about the outbreak, (2) a letter written
by the Taipei City Department of Health and signed by the mayor
was given to students to take home to their parents, and (3) SMS
messages were sent to all Taipei citizens with mobile phones. The
collective message of all three channels emphasized the severity of
the outbreak and outlined preventive measures, including home
confinement. According to results obtained from the questionnaire
(Table 3), home confinement of symptomatic students increased
from a rate of 10% prior to the implementation of the risk
communication program to 60% afterwards (p,0.05).
2. Disease containment. As mentioned above, Taipei
launched its mass risk communication program on October
12th. This was also the day that the epidemic reached its highest
peak. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the pre-weekend case surge
was reduced by almost half by October 15th (following the mass
risk communication campaign in Taipei).
In Keelung, where no such risk communication program was
launched, the epidemic lasted for thirty-four days and had
fourteen days of high attack rates within that period. In contrast,
the epidemic lasted thirteen days in Taipei and had less than five
days of high attack rates following the implementation of the risk
communication program.
The diffusion map in Figure 3 further illustrates the limited scope
and short duration of high AHC attack rates (labeled in red) in
Taipei districts. By October 17, attack rates in all Taipei districts
reduced to moderate levels (labeled in yellow) and then further
reduced to low levels (labeled in green) on October 26 (Figure 3).
3. Sources of information related to control measure
compliance and satisfaction evaluation of the SMS program.
According to Taipei City’s parents’ responses to the questionnaire,
primary sources for AHC information included TV news broadcasting
(54.45%), daily school health education programs during morning
assemblies (34.92%), and the Taipei City Department of Health letter
signed by the Mayor (29.28%) (Table 4). Approximately fourteen
percent (14.32%) of parents surveyed identified the short message
service (SMS) issued by the Taipei City Department of Health as their
primary source of AHC information.
Risk Communications in EIDs
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communication felt more satisfied with this method as a means of
public health communication than those who did not receive SMS
messages (3.89 vs. 3.01; p,0.05).
Discussion
Prompt and effective prevention and control measures to
combat EIDs are imperative to maintaining public health and
safety. In this study, we found that the multi-channel risk
communication program launched midway through the 2007
AHC epidemic in Taipei City increased the number of students
confined to their homes, reduced total duration and affected areas
of the epidemic, and decreased the number of dangerous, high
attack days. By interrupting the prevailing transmission route
between school and home, the program effectively inhibited the
spread of this highly communicable disease in the community.
AHC has been identified as a highly contagious disease, capable
of far-reaching, epidemic spread, since its first reported case in
1970 [2,14] The Coxsackie virus A24 (CV-A24) variant in
particular has been the causing agent of several difficult outbreaks.
It has also been a significant challenge to sensitivity and timeliness
efforts in disease surveillance systems [13,15]. In addition, the
virus’s eye-related symptoms [16,17,18] are not easily differenti-
ated from other infections (i.e. the human strain of Netherland’s
2003 avian influenza, H7N7) [19,20,21,22]. During the 2007
AHC epidemic in Taiwan, schools were found to be epicenters of
transmission. By focusing disease control efforts in the school
system, Taipei was more effective than neighboring Keelung
(which relied on traditional control strategies) at interrupting the
school-family-community cascade of transmission.
Because AHC was not initially listed as a reportable disease
when this outbreak first occurred, accessible data was initially
unavailable for cases before October 4, 2007. Several character-
istics of the 2007 outbreak suggest a foreign source for Taiwan’s
AHC epidemic. The introduction of the outbreak in Keelung, a
port city, and the genotype II status of the 2007 CV-24 virus (all
CV-24 viruses isolated in Taiwanese outbreaks prior to 2007 had
belonged to genotype III [13]) strongly suggest that the virus was
imported in the summer of 2007. The spread worsened in Taiwan
after schools returned to session in September. Although health
officials in Keelung had advocated for hand washing, eye
protection, and disinfection, new cases continued to rise after
October 8. The CV-24 virus, spread primarily through person-to-
person contact and contact with infected fomites, may also have
spread through contact with respiratory droplets and fecal-oral
routes, resulting in rapid and widespread transmission [13,15].
Older children were more likely to be members of case clusters at
home and at school. The reasons for this increased likelihood is
unknown, though it may be related to higher rates of participation
Figure 3. Spatio-temporal Diffusion Patterns of AHC Outbreaks from Keelung City to Taipei City, 2007. The X-axis reflects the temporal
scale, while the Y-axis displays district names ordered by geographical correlation from North to South, East to West. The horizontal purple line marks
the border between Keelung City and Taipei City.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.g003
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more than 3 family members. (1.261.7 days, range 0 to 6 days, vs. smaller cluster size 3.964.0 days, range 0 to 16 days, p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.g004
Table 2. Demographical Information of Participating School Children Presenting/Not Presenting Pink Eye Illness (Within/Outside
Family or School Clusters) during the AHC Outbreak in Taipei City, 2007.
Red Eye Illness Family Cluster School Class Cluster
Present Absent OR Yes No OR Yes No OR
Gender
Male 55 164 2.17* 32 187 1.45 53 166 2.15*
Female 28 181 22 186 27 182
Age (Years)
,10 15 128 10 133 12 131
§10 68 211 2.75* 45 234 2.56* 68 211 3.51*
School Grades
1–3 51 3 1 41 3 2 21 3 4
4–6 21 65 8.46*1 3 8 8 4.87*2 1 6 5 21.64*
7–9 57 181 8.25*3 8 2 0 06.27*5 8 1 8 121.47*
School Areas
Northeast 63 215 2.26*4 7 2 3 13.93*6 2 2 1 62.46*
Southwest 21 162 9 174 19 163
Index Case in Family
1st case 61 11 11.71*4 0 3 2 4.13*5 9 1 3 9.58*
Not 1st case 18 38 13 43 18 38
*p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.t002
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Research may be needed to fully understand this phenomenon. In
essence, school children serve as index cases in around seventy-five
percent of family clusters (Table 2) and are, indisputably, the
largest transmitters of the virus. The findings of the study illustrate
that schools serve as epicenters of CV-24 transmission and are
effective intervention targets for containing the virus before its
introduction to the general population.
The large weekend increases of CV-24 infection that occurred
in Keelung may have resulted from a lack of preventive measures
at home, e.g. ineffectiveness at keeping symptomatic children
separate from other family members and/or improper disinfection
of the home environment. Because the median time from exposure
to onset is short (median 1 day in Figure 4), AHC is able to spread
quickly from one index case to other family members, many of
whom might take it back to schools and larger communities over
the weekend. This creates a highly efficient family-school-
community transmission cascade that is capable of spreading
quickly throughout a city. Therefore, measures that effectively
reduce and isolate infections at home and at school would
contribute greatly to breaking the transmission cycle.
In the face of an unexpected outbreak of EID, risk
communication and management are essential for keeping
infection and mortality rates under control. The large disparity
between mortality rates of the 1918 influenza pandemic in
Philadelphia and St. Louis in the United States was due to distinct
differences in the preparedness and timeliness of their respective
local public health responses [23,24]. This example serves to
illustrate the importance of preventing and containing EIDs in a
systematic and timely manner.
As the Capital of Taiwan, Taipei City has a much larger
population size and density than Keelung City (Table 1). In
addition, Taipei is a highly dynamic city with frequent economic,
cultural, and social change. This inconstancy, coupled with its
status as a large international travel hub, makes the city
particularly vulnerable to EID. Much of Taipei’s preparedness
was the result of the city’s experience as Taiwan’s epicenter of the
SARS outbreak in 2003. After the SARS outbreak, Taipei City
Government initiated a new public health plan using an integrated
infection control system against EID. This new system integrated
early detection of outbreaks (particularly in hospitals and schools),
epidemiological investigation, and epidemiologically based public
health prevention and control policies. The renovated Division of
Disease Control and Prevention (Taipei’s CDC) also became the
core operational unit for implementing crisis management
procedures and facilitating policy. These systematic upgrades
allowed for quick enactment of multi-channel risk communication
measures during the 2007 outbreak of conjunctivitis.
The 2007 AHC outbreak provided the perfect opportunity for
Taipei health authorities to test the effectiveness of the newly
renovated system. Measures that were used to contain this
epidemic may also, in turn, serve as a practice model for dealing
with future influenza pandemics. There are many similarities
between AHC and novel influenza: (1) there is currently no
available vaccine for the circulating virus strain and anti-viral
treatment is limited, (2) time from exposure to onset is very short,
(3) the disease is highly contagious and easily contracted through
contact with contaminated aerosols/droplets or fomites, and (4)
schools serve as epicenters for the spread of the virus to households
and, eventually, to the larger community.
It has been previously demonstrated that home confinement of
symptomatic children can dramatically limit the spread of AHC
and influenza in the community [25,26,27]. The timely launch of
our multi-channel risk communication program to all Taipei
citizens on Friday, October 12, allowed us to provide clear
instructions to families on how to prevent the infection at home
over the course of weekend, when infection rates would normally
increase. These direct communication methods successfully
convinced parents to keep their symptomatic children at home
(from 10% to 60% in Table 3). With contagious students confined
to their homes, school transmissions decreased dramatically and
public health officials were able to contain the Taipei outbreak
quickly. The effectiveness of these innovative methods in the
heavily populated metropolitan area of Taipei City was evidenced
Table 3. Absentee Rates of Schoolchildren Pre and Post
MRCP in Taipei City, 2007.
AHC Onset
Date
Cases with School
Absenteeism
Cases Attended
Schools
Absenteeism
Rate (%)
Before MRCP{ 3 26 10.34%
After MRCP 8 5 61.54%*
{Mass risk communication program (MRCP) was launched on Oct. 12, 2007 in
Taipei City.
*p=0.00116.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.t003
Table 4. Parents’ Primary Sources for Control Measure Information from Taipei City Government.
Information Sources
Knowledge Content (%) Absent from School and
stay Home while Pinkeye
(N=461)
Household Segregation
for Pinkeye Illness
(N=461)
Household Environmental
Disinfection
(N=461)
TV Broadcasting 54.45% 50.54% 47.94%
Schools’ Prompt Daily Morning Assembly Education
Program
34.92% 34.49% 35.79%
Letter to Schoolchildren’s Parents 29.28% 27.98% 28.42%
Newspaper 24.95% 23.21% 22.34%
Mobile Phone SMS* 14.32% 10.20% 10.85%
Parent’s own Decision (from Regular Public Health
Resources)
7.81% 19.52% 22.56%
Radio News 5.64% 6.29% 5.42%
Taipei City Mayor’s Announcements 3.90% 4.77% 4.56%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.t004
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subsided after 2 weeks. This can be compared with the two months
that were needed to control Taipei’s previous CV-24 epidemic in
1987 [28].
The importance of appropriate risk communication in response
to disasters has often been overlooked by public health officials in
Taiwan. Traditionally, the mass media has helped disseminate
epidemic information and increase awareness on how health risks
may be reduced. However, the modern mass media has, at times,
had a negative impact on public health efforts by encouraging
public indifference or sensationalizing incomplete and inaccurate
information. The media’s reporting of the SARS outbreak
contributed to unnecessary chaos in the early phases of the
epidemic [29].
Rather than rely on the media alone to convey productive
messages regarding the epidemic, Taipei’s CDC was able to
implement its Multi-Channel Mass Risk Communication Program
to reach the public directly during critical points in the epidemic.
We believe the SMS messaging component of the program was
integral to the success of the 2007 AHC intervention and will
continue to explore the use of this tool. We know from our
questionnaire that fourteen percent of parents who confined their
affected children at home during 2007’s AHC outbreak reported
that their decision to comply with this preventive measure was
based on the SMS messages they received. Although the effects of
the cell phone method cannot be fully isolated from the multi-
channel risk communication system in this study, we believe that
future interventions that utilize SMS exclusively will provide more
insight on the effectiveness of this method. Taipei’s CDC has since
conducted a SMS campaign on Chinese Valentine’s Day in 2009
to reach high-risk groups for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV). The message asked the public to answer an AIDS-related
trivia question and also provided information on free, anonymous
HIV testing. After this exploratory campaign, Anonymous HIV
screening rates went up 20% from the same time the year before.
As SMS messaging is still an emerging approach to wide-scale
information dissemination, we believe that further examination
into the effectiveness of cell phone-based risk communication
methods will need to be done at the local, national, and
international level.
Taipei’s ability to launch such a large-scale SMS campaign
was a direct result of Taiwan’s Communicable Disease Act
(2006). This act allowed government officials to override the
people’s right to privacy when responding to epidemic disasters.
In this case, the Taipei city government held a contract with
Taiwan’s six major mobile phone companies and committed all
of them to allowing six free public service messages (per year) to
be sent to their users if deemed necessary by the proper
authorities. The SMS message in response to the AHC epidemic
was sent to 2.2 million registered mobile phone users in Taipei
City. Public satisfaction with the SMS campaign was high,
especially amongst parents of school children. While this mass
communication method has beena d v o c a t e df o ru s ei nm a n y
Asian countries, Taiwan’s large-scale employment of SMS
technology was, to the best of our knowledge, the first such
attempt in the world. While it was,o v e r a l l ,a ne f f e c t i v em e a n so f
communication, the efficacy of this method was limited by
several factors. First, the sudden influx of over two million
messages put a large burden on the network system and resulted
in a long delay (many received their message around midnight).
Second, many Taipei mobile phones users are registered in other
cities and did not receive the messages. Third, consumer
weariness may have caused some people to ignore the long,
unsolicited message before they read it. To reduce technical
limitations, we suggest that SMS surge capacity be increased and
tested at both non-epidemic and pre-pandemic stages. Other
limitations to the SMS tool and alternative mass communication
prevention methods can be fine-tuned with more experience,
frequently updated guidelines, an efficient system for risk
management, an integrated public health plan, and extra
training for public health personnel [30,31]. Another important
challenge is reaching diverse populations, particularly those with
low socio-economic status that may not be able to afford mobile
phone service (and reside in less affluent, high-risk areas) [32].
This may be less of problem in Taiwan than in other countries.
This study had several limitations, including a lack of early data
on pink-eye cases in Keelung. After the conclusion of the outbreak,
there was also no further assessment on the effectiveness of control
measures in Keelung. This study was non-randomized and missing
epidemiological information for calculating secondary attack rates,
age-specific asymptomatic ratios, and geographical diffusion of
AHC cases outside Taipei and Keelung. Seroepidemiological
studies in the future should be able to obtain more accurate
secondary attack data with the use of comprehensive infection and
disease exposure data.
In conclusion, the timely launch of the multi-channel risk
communication program described in this study greatly reduced
the duration and number of cases of Taiwan’s 2007 AHC
epidemic. These efforts effectively avoided a potentially large-scale
epidemic of AHC in Taipei City. In encountering challenges such
as outbreaks of influenza pandemic, or other EIDs with short
incubation periods, public health officials need to prepare an
integrated and timely administrative public health response.
Urgent intervention and education must reach the community
directly through multi-module channels, like SMS, for rapid
communication.
Geographical variations in epidemiological characteristics, as
described in our comparison analysis of the AHC epidemic in
Keelung versus Taipei, are similar to variations in swine-origin
H1N1 outbreaks in Mexico versus United States. Such similarities
support this intervention’s potential applicability to the prevention
and control of other EIDs. Based on the findings of this study, we
believe that the success of this risk communication method is
dependent on: (1) the timeliness of the communication, (2)
simplicity and consistency of the message, (3) appropriateness of
the channels of dissemination, (4) transparency of the information,
and (5) public faith in the communicator; in this instance the
mayor of Taipei. While we found that the use of SMS significantly
contributed to the effectiveness of the risk communication
program, more SMS-based campaigns and research, like the
HIV testing campaign mentioned in our manuscript, are needed
to fully evaluate its effectiveness at communicating public health
messages to the public.
Supporting Information
File S1 Informed Consent and Questionnaire. Written informed
consent was obtained before parents of the participated school-
children responded to the questionnaire.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007962.s001 (0.12 MB
PDF)
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